DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                BCMR Docket No. 2003-144 
 
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 

 

 
 

FINAL DECISION 

 
ANDREWS, Deputy Chair: 
 
 
This  proceeding  was  conducted  according  to  the  provisions  of  section  1552  of 
title 10 and section 425 of title 14 of the United States Code.  The BCMR docketed the 
case on September 29, 2003, upon receipt of the applicant’s completed application and 
military records. 
 
 
members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This  final  decision,  dated  May  20,  2004,  is  signed  by  the  three  duly  appointed 

RELIEF REQUESTED 

 
 
The applicant, who was discharged from the Coast Guard on July 19, 1968, under 
other than honorable conditions (OTH) after having been tried and convicted for pos-
session of marijuana in a civilian state court, asked the Board to correct his record by 
upgrading his discharge to honorable.  The applicant alleged that he would have made 
a career in the Coast Guard if he “hadn’t been set up in the bust that caused my wrong-
ful conviction.” 
 
 
for an incident that occurred while he was stationed on the Coast Guard cutter Xxxx.   

The applicant also asked that he be awarded a Gold or Silver Lifesaving Medal 

 

APPLICANT’S ALLEGATIONS 

 
 
The applicant alleged that two years after his conviction and discharge, he was 
proved  innocent  and  exonerated  on  appeal  and  “all  charges  were  dismissed.”    He 

alleged  that  the  court  issued  an  “Order  Dismissing  Accusation  Against  Probationer” 
that vacated his conviction.   
 

The applicant stated that when he previously tried to get his discharge upgrad-
ed,  he  could  not  find  a  copy  of  the  court’s order  because  he  was  unfamiliar  with  the 
microfiche  system  and  there  was  no  one  to  help  him.    However,  when  he  recently 
returned  to  the  courthouse,  a  clerk  helped  him  find  all  of  the  records  of  his  case, 
including the order that dismissed the charges.  He alleged that he discovered the errors 
in his record on May 22, 2003. 

 
The applicant alleged that since his discharge, he has been an advocate against 
drug  abuse  for  seventeen  years  by  circulating  a  poster  to  educate  children  about  the 
perils of social drug use.  In addition, he stated that twice each year, he visits a veterans’ 
hospital to cheer up patients with presents. 
 
 
In  support  of  his  allegations,  the  applicant  submitted  a  microfiche  copy  of  an 
“Order  Dismissing  Accusation  Against  Probationer”  dated  June  18,  1970.    The  order 
indicates that on February 23, 1968, a state court placed the applicant on probation for 
three  years  after  he  was  convicted  of  possessing  marijuana.    The  order  states  that 
because the applicant had fulfilled the conditions of his probation, the conviction was 
“vacated and a plea of not guilty entered.”  The order further states that the “Accusa-
tion filed [in the case is] dismissed” and that the applicant should be “released from all 
penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense.” 
 

The  applicant  also  submitted  a  letter  from  an  attorney,  who  stated  that  he  has 
known the applicant for twenty years and that the applicant “is loyal, selfless, and gen-
erous to a fault”; copies of posters in English and Spanish that bear the applicant’s name 
and  show  “crystal  meth”  as  a  rat  trap  catching  a  person;  several  letters  from  various 
government  offices  acknowledging  a  letter  from  the  applicant  about  his  efforts  to 
inform children about the dangers of substance abuse; a copy of a flier about a “Ride 
Against Terrorism to Salute America’s Veterans” that also bears the applicant’s name as 
a  contact  person;  a  newspaper  clipping  stating  that  the  applicant  had  led  efforts  to 
recruit  the  local  fishing  industry  to  provide  fish  to  feed  the  homeless;  a  letter  stating 
that  the  applicant  had  done  community  service  for  the  xxxxxxx  County  Interfaith 
Council for several years; and two letters to the applicant from relief agencies, thanking 
him for many donations of tons of fresh fish to feed the hungry and homeless. 

 
Regarding his request for a Gold or Silver Lifesaving Medal, the applicant stated 
that during a search and rescue off the coast of New Jersey, he and a crewmate were 
ordered into a small boat to help search for bodies.  His crewmate was unskilled and 
“maneuvered the boat too close to shore, athwart the ground swells, and we broached 
to.”  The applicant stated that, though weighed down by foul weather gear, he made it 
to shore, but his crewmate did not.  The applicant alleged that he spotted his crewmate 

in the water, shed his gear and boots, and dove back into the heavy surf to rescue his 
crewmate.  When he reached his crewmate, he discovered that the propeller had cut his 
crewmate’s  arm.    The  applicant  stated  that  after  “what  seemed  like  an  eternity,”  he 
managed to get his crewmate ashore.  The applicant alleged that he then removed his 
crewmate’s  “upper  clothing”  and  squeezed  his  arm  to  stop  the  bleeding.    They  were 
picked up “after a time” by a jeep from a nearby aid station. 
 

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD 

 

 
On  October  15,  1965,  the  applicant  enlisted  in  the  Coast  Guard  for  four  years.  
Upon  completing  boot  camp  on  December  17,  1965,  he  was  advanced  from  seaman 
recruit  (SR)  to  seaman  apprentice  (SA).    On  January  2,  1966,  he  reported  aboard  the 
Xxxx.  An entry in the applicant’s record shows that the entire crew of his cutter was 
commended  for  their  performance  of  search  and  rescue  activities  during  a  storm  on 
January 23 and 24, 1966.  The applicant’s record contains no confirmation of the alleged 
incident in which he saved a crewmate’s life. 
 
 
On November 1, 1966, the applicant was advanced to seaman (SN).  However, on 
December 19, 1966, the applicant was reduced back to SA and restricted to base for six 
days with extra duties as non-judicial punishment he received at  a captain’s  mast for 
violating Article 92 the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by being derelict in his 
duties.  He never regained his rank. 
 
On August 7, 1967, the applicant  began “A” School to become a dental techni-
 
cian.  On October 18, 1967, the Group Commander informed the Commandant that the 
applicant had been arrested by civil authorities on October 14, 1967, for possession and 
furnishing  of  marijuana,  and  was  released  on  bail  on  October  17,  1967.    The  Group 
Commander stated that the applicant had been disenrolled from “A” School but would 
remain in the custody of the training center pending the results of his trial. 
 
On  November  3,  1967,  the  applicant  was  taken  to  captain’s  mast  after  he  was 
 
found to have asked another SA to take some narcotics pills from him and plant them in 
a third SA’s car.  The “sentence” awarded was trial by a special court-martial for vio-
lating Article 134 of the UCMJ.  However, the command never held the special court-
martial because of the civil proceedings against the applicant. 
 
 
On November 7, 1967, the applicant received a psychiatric evaluation.  Accord-
ing  to  the  psychiatrist’s  report,  he  refused  to  discuss  his  legal  problems  but  admitted 
that  he  was  “hoping  to  be  found  temporarily  insane”  to  escape  conviction.    The  psy-
chiatrist found the applicant to be intelligent, with no delusions or hallucinations, but 
noted that his personality was passive-aggressive and manipulative.  The psychiatrist 
reported  that  the  applicant  was  “so  far  free  from  mental  defect,  disease  or  derange-

ment”  as  to  be  able  to  distinguish  right  from  wrong,  adhere  to  the  right,  and  under-
stand the charges and proceedings. 
 
On December 18, 1967, the applicant was arraigned.  On December 19, 1968, his 
 
command  was  notified  that  on  February  2,  1968,  he  would  be  tried  in  state  court  for 
(a) possession of marijuana and (b) possession of marijuana for sale. 
 
 
On February 8, 1968, the applicant was taken to captain’s mast for having been 
away without leave (AWOL) for two hours and ten minutes on January 29, 1968.  He 
was awarded two days’ restriction to base with extra duties. 
 
 
On March 1, 1968, the applicant’s CO notified the Commandant that on February 
2, 1968, pursuant to a plea bargain, the charge of possession of marijuana for sale was 
dropped  and  the  applicant  pled  guilty  to  possession  of  marijuana.    The  CO  further 
stated  that  at  a  sentencing  hearing  on  February  26,  1968,  the  applicant  had  been  sen-
tenced to 90 days’ confinement and a suspended three-year sentence during which he 
would be on probation.  The CO recommended that the applicant receive an undesir-
able discharge. 
 
 
On May 23, 1968, the applicant was arrested on suspicion of burglary and pos-
session of marijuana, but the state dropped all of the charges because the homeowner 
had called the applicant and asked him to enter her home to feed her dog while she was 
in jail and because he claimed he did not know a friend who went with him was carry-
ing marijuana. 
 
 
On  June  3,  1968,  the  applicant  was  taken  to  mast  for  having  slept  through  his 
duties as mess cook on May 28 and 30, 1968.  He was awarded seven days’ restriction to 
base and fourteen hours of extra duties. 
 
 
On June 6, 1968, the applicant’s CO informed the Commandant that the applicant 
had been released from jail on May 2, 1968, and that an Administrative Discharge Board 
(ADB) convened on May 8, 1968, had recommended that he receive an undesirable dis-
charge. 
 
 
On June 27, 1968, the applicant failed to rise at reveille or report to muster, was 
found in bed at 9:05 a.m., and thereafter attempted to find breakfast instead of reporting 
for duty.  He was taken to mast and awarded two weeks’ restriction to base with extra 
duties. 
 
 
On July 15, 1968, the applicant was further reduced to SR at a captain’s mast for 
failing to obey an order by not rising at reveille and participating in morning clean-up 
on July 7, 1968.  His punishment also included restriction to base with extra duties. 
 

 
On July 16, 1968, the findings and recommendation of the ADB were approved 
by  the  Acting  Chief  of  the  Office  of  Personnel.    On  July  18,  1968,  the  Commandant 
ordered that the applicant be discharged for misconduct due to his conviction by civil 
authorities. 
 
 
On  July  19,  1968,  the  applicant  received  an  undesirable  discharge  under  other 
than honorable conditions by reason of “misconduct due to trial and conviction by civil 
authority” under Article 12-B-13 of the Personnel Manual.  His DD 214 indicates that he 
was entitled to wear only the National Defense Service Medal. 
 
 
upgrade to his discharge.  On December 31, 1977, his request was denied. 
 

In  1977,  the  applicant  applied  to  a  Special  Discharge  Review  Board  for  an 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 

On February 25, 2004, the Judge Advocate General of the Coast Guard submitted 
an advisory opinion recommending that the Board waive the statute of limitations and 
grant partial relief in this case by upgrading the applicant’s discharge to a general dis-
charge.  He based his recommendation on a memorandum on the case prepared by the 
Coast Guard Personnel Command (CGPC). 

 
CGPC stated that the “Order Dismissing Accusation Against Probationer” is not 
a legal action that negates the underlying facts of the case but a “routine legal process 
used in California to remove misdemeanor offenses from a person’s criminal record.”  
However, CGPC argued that since the applicant’s discharge was based on his civil con-
viction, “the presumption that the Coast Guard’s original basis to separate the member 
remains valid is questionable.” 

 
CGPC stated that the Coast Guard committed no errors in discharging the appli-
cant under other than honorable conditions since his record documents “a chronic pat-
tern  of  misconduct”  and  he  was  “afforded  his  due  process  rights.”    However,  CGPC 
stated, given the expungement of his civil conviction and the evidence he has submitted 
indicating that he has become a good citizen and “overcome the behavioral traits that 
led to his separation, it would be in the interest of justice to upgrade his discharge to 
“General, Under Honorable Conditions.”  CGPC argued that because of the applicant’s 
“consistent record of misconduct and his documented illegal involvement with illegal 
drugs on at least two occasions,” he is not entitled to an honorable discharge.  

 
Neither CGPC nor the Judge Advocate General addressed the applicant’s request 

for a lifesaving medal. 

 

 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
On March 1, 2004, the Chair sent the applicant a copy of the views of the Coast 
Guard and invited him to respond within 30 days.  On March 31, the applicant respond-
ed.  He stated that while he “was not a model Coastie,” his problem with making rev-
eille was caused primarily by “sleep apnea/deprivation.” 
 
 
The applicant stated that he cannot recall the incident in  which  he encouraged 
someone to plant pills on the “snitch,” but if he did he “must have felt justified for [he] 
was betrayed by the very system [he] volunteered to serve.”  He alleged that the snitch 
had  driven  him  against  his  will  to  the  apartment  of  the  “guilty  5  defendants”  and 
banged on their door for 20 minutes to wake them up.  The applicant alleged that he 
tried to dissuade the snitch and returned to the car to go to sleep, but the snitch refused 
to let him stay in the car.  He alleged that when someone opened the door, the snitch 
entered  the  apartment,  pulled  out  three  or  four  hand-rolled  cigarettes,  and  said,  “It’s 
party  time.    Let’s  get  high!”    He  also  alleged  that  he  and  the  snitch  did  not  actually 
smoke the marijuana but that he was arrested and charged along with the others so that 
he would not be able to go back to school, where fellow students would have asked him 
where the arrested students had gone.  He alleged that he was arrested simply to save 
the Coast Guard from “more embarrassment.” 
 

APPLICABLE LAW 

 

Under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a), the BCMR “may correct any military record of the Sec-
 
retary’s department when the [Board acting on behalf of the] Secretary considers it nec-
essary to correct an error or remove an injustice.”   
 
 
Under  Article  12-B-13  of  the  Personnel  Manual  in  effect  in  1968,  the  Comman-
dant  could  separate  a  member  for  misconduct  with  an  undesirable  discharge  if  the 
member had been convicted by a civil authority for an offense that, under the UCMJ, 
was punishable by confinement for more than one year.  Under the UCMJ, the maxi-
mum punishment for possession or sale of marijuana in 1968 was five years’ confine-
ment at hard labor and a dishonorable discharge.  
 
 
Under Article 20.C. of the current Personnel Manual, any member involved in a 
“drug incident” today may be administratively discharged with no greater than a gen-
eral discharge under honorable conditions.  Under Article 20.A.2.k., a “drug incident is 
defined as “[i]ntentional drug abuse, wrongful possession of, or trafficking in drugs. … 
A civil or military conviction for wrongful use, possession, etc., or controlled substances 
is  prima  facie  evidence  of  a  drug  incident.    The  member  need  not  be  found  guilty  at 
court-martial, in a civilian court, or be awarded [non-judicial punishment at a captain’s 
mast] for the behavior to be considered a drug incident.” Article 12.B.18.b.4. provides 
that  any  enlisted  member  involved  in  a  “drug  incident”  shall  be  separated  with  no 
higher than a general discharge.  Article 12.B.2.c.(2) states that a “general discharge” is a 
separation “under honorable conditions.” 

 

Under  Article  112a  of  the  current  UCMJ,  possession  of  30  grams  or  more  of 
marijuana is punishable by a dishonorable discharge and five years’ confinement.  Pos-
session of less than 30 grams is punishable by a dishonorable discharge and two years’ 
confinement.  Distribution of marijuana is punishable by a dishonorable discharge and 
fifteen years’ confinement. 
 

Under Article 12-B-14 of the Personnel Manual in effect in 1968, a member being 
discharged  for  misconduct  had  a  right  to  be  informed  of  the  pending  action  and  to 
submit a statement in his own behalf and he had a right to appear before an ADB repre-
sented by counsel.  (However, under Article 12-B-13(c), the Commandant could waive 
the ADB when the evidence clearly established the conviction by civil authorities.)  The 
ADB would recommend whether the member should be discharged and, if so, the char-
acter  of  discharge.    The  recommendation  of  the  ADB  was  subject  to  approval  by  the 
Commandant. 
 
 
Under  Article  12-B-2  of  the  Personnel  Manual,  the  character  of  separation  of  a 
member  who  received  an  “undesirable  discharge”  was  under  “conditions  other  than 
honorable.” 
 

In United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1979), the defendant argued 
that a federal statute making it unlawful for someone to receive a firearm if he had been 
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year did not apply 
to him because his prior conviction had been expunged by the state of Idaho.  The U.S. 
Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Ninth  Circuit  held  that  the  state’s  action  did  not  affect  the 
defendant’s convicted status for the purposes of the federal statute.1 
 
In Yacovone v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the defendant was fired by 
 
the U.S. Postal Service after being convicted for shoplifting.  The Governor of Vermont 
granted  the  defendant  a  full  pardon.    The  D.C.  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  upheld  the 
defendant’s dismissal, finding that the pardon did not erase the conviction for purposes 
of federal employment.2 
 
 
ing determination, which has never been countermanded:  
 

On July 7, 1976, the delegate of the Secretary informed the BCMR of the follow-

                                                 
1 United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing many similar decisions, including 
United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1974)). See also Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1974), in 
which  the  U.S.  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Seventh  Circuit  held  that  a  state  pardon  has  no  impact  on  a 
federal disability resulting from a state conviction. 
 
2 Yacovone v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 1028, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 

[T]he Board should  not upgrade discharges  solely  on the basis of post-service conduct.  
The situation in which a man is granted a less than honorable discharge under circum-
stances all agree were just, and then goes on to become Albert Schweitzer, is one that—if 
it ever occurs—is properly handled by an exemplary rehabilitation certificate or a Presi-
dential pardon. 
 
This emphatically does not mean that the justness of a discharge must be judged by the 
criteria  prevalent  at  the  time  it  was  rendered.    The  Board  is  entirely  free  to  take  into 
account changes in community mores, civilian as well as military, since the time of dis-
charge was rendered, and upgrade a discharge if it is judged to be unduly severe in light 
of contemporary standards. …. [T]he Board should not upgrade [a] discharge unless it is 
convinced, after having considered all the evidence [in the record], that in light of today’s 
standards the discharge was disproportionately severe vis-à-vis the conduct in response 
to which it was imposed. 

 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

 
 
The  Board  makes  the  following  findings  and  conclusions  on  the  basis  of  the 
applicant's military record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, and appli-
cable law: 
 

The  Board  has  jurisdiction  concerning  this  matter  pursuant  to  10  U.S.C. 

1. 
§ 1552.   
 
2. 

An  application  to  the  Board  must  be  filed  within  three  years  after  the 
applicant  discovered  or  reasonably  should  have  discovered  the  alleged  error  in  his 
record.3    The  record  indicates  that  the  applicant  signed  and  received  his  discharge 
documents in 1968.  Therefore, he knew or should have know of the character of his dis-
charge and his lack of a lifesaving medal at that time.  Although the applicant stated 
that he did not discover the documentation of the vacation of his criminal record until 
May  22,  2003,  the  Board  believes  that  he  knew  or  should  have  known  of  the  court’s 
action soon after June 18, 1970.  At the time of his plea bargaining and sentencing, the 
court or his attorney presumably told the applicant that if he met the terms of his pro-
bation, the misdemeanor conviction would be vacated.  Moreover, even if they failed to 
do so, the applicant’s own failure to investigate and find the documentation for more 
than 30 years does not toll the Board’s statute of limitations.  Thus, his application was 
untimely. 

 
3. 

The  Board  may  waive  the  three-year  statute  of  limitations  if  it  is  in  the 
interest of justice to do so.4  Factors for the Board to consider in determining whether it 
is in the interest of justice to waive the statute of limitations include any stated reasons 
for the delay and whether a cursory review of the record indicates that there is some 

                                                 
3 10 U.S.C. § 1552; 33 C.F.R. § 52.22. 
4 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b). 

merit in the case.5  The applicant did not explain why he delayed seeking an upgrade of 
his  reenlistment  code  and  the  lifesaving  medal.  However,  the  Board’s  review  of  the 
record  indicates  that  the  Judge  Advocate  General  has  recommended  granting  partial 
relief.  Therefore, the Board will waive the statute of limitations and consider the appli-
cation on the merits. 

 
4. 

The record indicates that the applicant was properly discharged from the 
Coast  Guard  under  other  than  honorable  conditions  after  he  was  convicted  by  civil 
authorities of possession of marijuana in a plea bargain under which the charge of pos-
session for sale was dropped and he was sentenced to 90 days’ confinement and three 
years’  probation.    The  record  indicates  that he  was  afforded  all  due  process  in  accor-
dance with Article 12-B-14 of the Personnel Manual in effect at the time.  Although the 
applicant  alleged  that  he  was  innocent  of  the  charges,  he  submitted  no  evidence  that 
supports this allegation. 

 
5. 

 The record further indicates that because the applicant met the terms of 
his probation, the state court issued an “Order Dismissing Accusation Against Proba-
tioner” on June 18, 1970, which vacated his conviction.  The applicant alleged that the 
court’s order proved him innocent and exonerated him.  However, the court’s order did 
not prove him innocent or exonerate him.  The court’s order on June 18, 1970, merely 
removed the conviction from his criminal record as a reward for the fact that he met the 
terms of his probation. 

 
6. 

CGPC  argued  that  the  court’s  order  of  June 18,  1970,  rendered  the  basis 
 
for  the  applicant’s  discharge  “questionable.”    However,  the  law  is  clear  that  a  state’s 
decision to expunge or pardon a conviction has no impact on a federal disability—such 
as an undesirable discharge—arising from the state conviction.6  Therefore, the “Order 
Dismissing Accusation Against Probationer” has no legal effect on the applicant’s unde-
sirable discharge. 
 

7. 

 The delegate of the Secretary permits the Board, in deciding whether to 
upgrade a discharge, to consider changing community mores.  However, the Board is 
not persuaded that mores regarding military members’ involvement with illegal drugs 
have  changed  significantly  since  1968.    Certainly  the  range  of  available  disciplinary 
actions for involvement with illegal drugs under the Personnel Manual and the UCMJ 
has  not  significantly  changed.    Although  some  members  of  the  Coast  Guard  who  are 
involved in a “drug incident” today receive a general discharge under honorable condi-
tions pursuant to Article 20.C. of the Personnel Manual, marijuana possession can also 
result  in  an  OTH  administrative  discharge,  such  as  the  applicant  received,  or  a  dis-
                                                 
5 See Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Allen v. Card, 799 F. Supp. 158, 164 
(D.D.C. 1992). 
6 Yacovone v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 1028, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 
1979; United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1974)); Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1974). 

honorable  discharge  and  confinement  in  prison.    Moreover,  in  addition  to  being  con-
victed  of  possession  of  marijuana,  the  applicant  was  charged  by  the  State  with 
possession of marijuana for sale (but this charge was dropped in a plea bargain) and by 
the Coast Guard with conspiracy to plant narcotics on another member (but the court-
martial was never held because of the civil charges against him).  His military record 
also reveals several other incidents of misconduct.  Given the applicant’s overall record 
of  misconduct  and  alleged  misconduct,  the  Board  is  not  persuaded  that,  if  he  had 
committed  the  same  offenses  in  the  Coast  Guard  today,  he  would  have  received 
anything better than an OTH discharge. 

 
8. 

 CGPC argued that the Board should upgrade the applicant’s discharge to 
general,  under  honorable  conditions,  because  the  evidence  of  record  indicates  that  he 
has  become  a  good  citizen.    However,  the  delegate  of  the  Secretary  has  held  that  the 
Board  “should  not  upgrade  discharges  solely  on  the  basis  of  post-service  conduct.”  
This does not mean, however, that the Board cannot consider post-service conduct as a 
factor in deciding whether it would be in the interest of justice to upgrade a discharge.  
The  applicant  has  proved  that  after  his  discharge,  he  was  for  several  years  a  driving 
force behind a program in which the local fishing industry provided tons of fresh fish to 
feed the hungry and homeless and that he himself provided tons of fresh fish for charity 
while  working  as  a  fisherman.    He  also  apparently  has  volunteered  on  behalf  of  dis-
abled  veterans  and  distributed  a  poster  warning  people  of  the  dangers  of  “crystal 
meth.” 
 
9. 

The  delegate  of  the  Secretary  has  held  that  “[t]he  Board  should  not 
upgrade  [a]  discharge  unless  it  is  convinced,  after  having  considered  all the  evidence 
… , that in light of today’s standards the discharge was disproportionately severe vis-à-
vis the conduct in response to which it was imposed.”  Despite the recommendation of 
the Judge Advocate General and the charitable acts of the applicant in the intervening 
years, the Board is unable to conclude that his discharge was disproportionately severe 
or that it is in the interest of justice to upgrade the applicant’s discharge. 

 
10. 

 The  applicant  also  asked  to  be  awarded  a  Gold  or  Silver  Lifesaving 
Medal.  Although the record confirms that as a crewmember of the Xxxx, the applicant 
was involved in search and rescue missions, there is no evidence in the record to sup-
port  his  allegation  of  having  saved  the  life  of  his  crewmate.    Absent  evidence  to  the 
contrary, the Board is required to presume that the Coast Guard has acted correctly and 
in good faith.7  Therefore, since the applicant has submitted no evidence to support his 
story of saving his crewmate’s life during a search and rescue mission, the Board must 
presume that the applicant’s record is correct as it is, without the lifesaving medal.   

 

                                                 
7 33 C.F.R. § 52.24(b); Arens v. United States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sanders v. United States, 
594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 1979). 

11.  Accordingly, the applicant’s requests should be denied.   

 

 

 

 

 
 

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES APPEAR ON NEXT PAGE] 

ORDER 

 

The application of former SR xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USCG, for correction of his 

military record is denied. 
 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

        

 
 Bruce D. Burkley 

 

 

 

 
 Harold C. Davis, MD 

 

 

 

 
 John M. Dickinson